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We introduce a model for the adaptive evolution of a network of company ownerships. In a recent
work it has been shown that the empirical global network of corporate control is marked by a central,
tightly connected “core” made of a small number of large companies which control a significant part
of the global economy. Here we show how a simple, adaptive “rich get richer” dynamics can account
for this characteristic, which incorporates the increased buying power of more influential companies,
and in turn results in even higher control. We conclude that this kind of centralized structure
can emerge without it being an explicit goal of these companies, or as a result of a well-organized
strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The worldwide network of company ownership pro-
vides crucial information for the systemic analysis of the
world economy [1, 2]. A complete understanding of its
properties and how they are formed has a wide range
of potential applications, including assessment and eva-
sion of systemic risk [3], collusion and antitrust regula-
tion [4, 5], market monitoring [6, 7], and strategic in-
vestment [8]. Recently, Vitali et al [9] inferred the net-
work structure of global corporate control, using the Or-
bis 2007 marketing database [10]. Analyzing its struc-
ture, they found a tightly connected “core” made of a
small number of large companies (mostly financial in-
stitutions) which control a significant part of the global
economy. A central question which arises is what is the
dominant mechanism behind this centralization of con-
trol. The answer is not obvious, since the decision of firms
to buy other firms can be driven by diverse goals: Banks
act as financial intermediaries doing monitoring for unin-
formed investors [6, 7], managers can improve their power
by buying other firms instead of paying dividends [11],
speculation on stock prices as well as dividend earnings
can be a significant source of revenue [11–13], and compa-
nies can have strategic advantages, e.g. due to knowledge
sharing [8, 14, 15]. Another possible hypothesis for con-
trol centralization is that managers collude to form in-
fluential alliances: Indeed, agents (e.g. board members)
often work for different firms in central positions [16]. Al-
though all these factors are likely to play a role, we here
investigate a different hypothesis, namely that a central-
ized structure may arise spontaneously, as a result of a
simple “richt-get-richer” dynamics [17], without any ex-
plicit underlying strategy from the part of the companies.
We consider a simple adaptive feedback mechanism [18],
which incorporates the indirect control that companies
have on other companies they own, which in turn in-
creases their buying power. The higher buying power can
then be used to buy portions of more important compa-
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nies, or a larger number of less important ones, which
further increases their relative control, and progressively
marginalizes smaller companies. We show that this sim-
ple dynamical ingredient suffices to reproduce many of
the qualitative features observed in the real data [9], in-
cluding the emergence of a core-periphery structure and
the relative portion of control exerted by the dominating
core. Although this does not preclude the possibility that
companies may take advantage and further consolidate
their privileged positions in the network, it does suggest
that deliberate strategizing may not be the dominating
factor which leads to global centralization.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider a network of N companies, where a di-
rected edge between two nodes j → i means company j
owns a portion of company i. The relative amount of i
which j owns is given by the matrix wij (i.e. the own-
ership shares), such that
∑
j wij = 1. We note that it is
possible for self-loops to exist, i.e. a company can in prin-
ciple buy its own shares. In the following, we describe a
model with two main mechanisms: 1. The evolution of
the relative control of companies, given a static network;
2. The evolution of the network topology via adaptive
rewiring of the edges.
A. Evolution of control
Here we assume that if j owns i, it exerts some influ-
ence on i in a manner which is proportional to wij . If we
let vj describe the relative amount of control a company
j has on other companies, we can write
vj = 1− α+ α
∑
i
Aijwijvi, (1)
where Aij is the adjacency matrix, the parameter α de-
termines the propagation of control and 1−α is an intrin-
sic amount of independence between companies [19]. We
further assume that the control value vj directly affects
other features such as profit margins, and overall market
influence, such that the buying power of companies with
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2large vj is also increased. This means that the owner-
ship of a company i is distributed among the owners j,
proportionally to their control vj , i.e.
wij =
Aijvj∑
lAilvl
, (2)
(see Fig. 1). These equations are assumed to evolve in a
faster time scale, such that equilibrium is reached before
the topology changes, as described in the next section.
vj
viwij
vj
vl
wij
FIG. 1. Illustration of the control of firms including indirect
control (left) and the ownership being proportional to the
control (right), as described in the text.
B. Evolution of the network topology
Companies may decide to buy or sell shares of a given
company at a given time. The actual mechanisms reg-
ulating these decisions are in general complicated and
largely unknown, since they may involve speculation, ac-
tual market value, and other factors, which we do not at-
tempt to model in detail here. Instead, we describe these
changes probabilistically, where an edge may be deleted
or inserted randomly in the network, and such moves
may be accepted or rejected depending on how much it
changes the control of the nodes involved. For simplicity,
we force the total amount of edges in the network to be
kept constant, such that a random edge deletion is always
accompanied by a random edge insertion. Such “moves”
may be rejected or accepted, based on the change they
bring to the vj values of the companies involved. If we
let m be the company which buys new shares of company
l, and j which sells shares of company i, the probability
that the move is accepted is
p = min
(
1, eβ(w˜lmvl−wijvi)
)
, (3)
where wij is computed before the move and w˜lm after-
wards, and the parameter β determines the capacity com-
panies have to foresee the advantage of the move, such
that for β = 0 all random moves are accepted, and for
β → ∞ they are only accepted if the net gain is pos-
itive (see Fig. 2). Note that in Eq. 3 it is implied that
companies with larger control will tend to buy more than
companies with smaller control, which is well justified by
our assumption that control is correlated with profit and
wealth.
vl
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FIG. 2. Illustration of the adaptive process, before the
rewiring (left) and afterwards (right), as described in the text.
The overall dynamics is composed by performing many
rewiring steps as described above, until an equilibrium
is reached, i.e. the observed network properties do not
change any longer. In order to preserve a separation of
time scales between the control and rewiring dynamics,
we performed a sufficiently large number of iterations of
Eqs. 1 and 2 before each attempted edge move.
III. CENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL
A typical outcome of the dynamics can be seen in Fig. 3
for a network with N = 3 × 104 nodes and average de-
gree 〈k〉 = 2, after an equilibration time of about 6× 109
steps. In contrast to the case with β = 0, which results
in a fully random graph, for a sufficiently high value of
β the distribution of firm ownerships (i.e. the out-degree
of the nodes) becomes very skewed, with a bimodal form.
We can divide the most powerful companies into a broad
range which owns shares from 10 to about 150 other com-
panies, and a separate group with kout > 150. The cor-
relation matrix of this network shows that these high-
degree nodes are connected strongly among themselves,
and own a large portion of the remaining companies (see
Fig. 3). This corresponds to a highly connected “core” of
about 45 nodes with 〈ksub〉 ≈ 39.8, which is highlighted
in red in Fig. 3c and can be seen separately in Fig. 3d.
The distribution of in-degree (not shown) is bimodal as
well with highest values for the inner core. With values
up to kin = 50, the highest in-degree (number of owners)
is considerably below the highest out-degree (number of
firms owned at once).
Similarly to the out-degree, the distribution of con-
trol values vi is also bimodal for larger values of β, as
can be seen in Fig. 4, and is strongly correlated with
the out-degree values. The total fraction of companies
controlled by the most powerful ones is very large, as
shown on the right panel of Fig. 4. For instance, we see
that a fraction of around 0.15% of the central core con-
trols about 57% of all companies. The companies with
intermediary values of control (and out-degree) also pos-
sess a significant part of the global control, e.g. around
.85% of the most powerful control an additional 25% of
the network. It is important to emphasize the difference
between these two classes of companies for two reasons:
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FIG. 3. (a) Degree distribution of the resulting network for 〈k〉 = 2, a control propagation value of α = 0.5, N = 30000 and
different values of prior knowledge β; (b) Degree correlation matrix for β = 10, showing the resulting core-periphery structure;
(c) Graph layout of the whole network, with red nodes representing a chosen fraction of the most highly connected core, and
blue ones the periphery; (d) Subgraph of the most powerful companies with vi > 20 (about 100). The node colors and sizes
correspond to the vi values.
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FIG. 4. Left: Distribution of inherited control vi− (1−α) for
α = 0.5 and different values of β; Right: Relative fraction of
control as a function of fraction of most powerful companies.
Firstly the inner core inherits control from intermediate
companies without the need to gather up all the minor
companies. In fact the ownership links going out from
the inner core (about 104) is enough to cover the direct
control of only a third of all companies, while the effec-
tive control is more than a half. Secondly, the fraction
of intermediary companies increases for larger networks.
For a network with N = 3× 105, the inner core includes
a fraction of only 0.04%, controlling an effective 41% of
the total companies. Nonetheless, all the most powerful
companies together account for around 1% of the net-
work and 82% of the total control; values which do not
change considerably with system size.
Let us compare the results presented so far with em-
pirical data presented in [9]. For different reasons, this
comparison can only be qualitative. First of all, the em-
pirical data includes economic agents with different func-
tions (shareholders, transnational companies and partic-
ipated companies) out of different sectors (eg. financial
and real economy), while we consider identical agents.
Secondly, we force every company to be owned 100%,
while the empirical data neglects restrained shares and
diversified holdings. Thirdly, the control analysis in [9]
is done somewhat differently: All the 600, 508 economic
agents were considered for the topological characteriza-
tion, while many companies (80% of all agents there)
were neglected for the control analysis. In the empirical
data, a strongly connected component of 1, 318 compa-
nies controls more than a half of all companies arranged
in the out component. This concentration is compati-
ble with the core-periphery structure presented in Fig. 3,
however the empirical data does not show a distinct bi-
modal structure. Nonetheless, there are highly connected
substructures in the core, e.g. a structure with 22 highly
connected financial companies (〈ksub〉 ≈ 12) was high-
lighted in [3]. The control concentration in the empirical
data was reported as a fraction of 0.5% which controls
80% of the network. This is similar to the results of
our model (see Fig. 4 on the right). There are, however,
features that our model does not reproduce, the most im-
portant of which being the out-degree distribution of the
network, which in [9] is very broad, and displays no dis-
cernible scales, where in our case it is either bimodal or
Poisson-like. One possible explanation for this discrep-
ancy is that we have focused on equilibrium steady-state
configurations of the dynamics, whereas the real economy
is surely far away from such an equilibrium. A more pre-
cise model would need to incorporate such transient dy-
namics in a more realistic way. Nevertheless, the general
tendency of the control to be concentrated on relatively
few companies is evident in such equilibrium states, and
features very prominently in the empirical data as well.
A. Transition to centralization
To investigate the transition from homogeneous no
centralized networks with increasing β, we measured the
inverse participation ratio I =
[
1
TN
∑
ti vi(t)
2
]−1
with
the time t summing over a sufficiently long time window
of length T after equilibration. Since 1N ≤ I ≤ 1, we
expect I = 1 in the perfectly homogeneous case where
4vi = 1 for all nodes, and I =
1
N if only one node has
vi > 0, and the control is maximally concentrated. As
can be seen in Fig. 5, we observe a smooth transition from
very homogeneous companies connected in fully random
manner for β = 0, to a pronounced concentration of
control for increased β, for which the aforementioned
core-periphery is observed. The transition becomes more
abrupt when either the average degree 〈k〉 is increased or
the parameter α (which determines the fraction of inher-
ited control) is decreased.
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FIG. 5. Inverse participation ratio I =
[
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∑
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2
]−1
as
a function of β, for a network with N = 104, and for (left)
〈k〉 = 2 and different values of α and (right) α = 0.5 and
different values of 〈k〉.
100 101 102 103
kout (Number of owned firms)
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
ρ
α=0.2
α=0.8
10-1 100 101 102
Inherited control vi−(1−α)
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
ρ
α=0.2
α=0.8
FIG. 6. Distribution of out degrees (left) and inherited control
vi − (1− α) (right) for β = 10, 〈k〉 = 2 and N = 30000 as in
Fig. 3 and 4, but for different values of α.
Centralization of control can emerge in different ways
depending on the parameters α and β. In Fig. 6, it is
shown that different values of α for a high value of β =
10 can lead to a detached controlling core (α = 0.2) or
to broadly distributed control values (α = 0.8). With
smaller values of α, indirect control is suppressed and
companies can gain power only by owning large numbers
of marginal companies. E.g.: for α = 0.2, this leads to
a highly connected core of 41 companies having 〈ksub〉 ≈
18.2, the rest of the companies have very little influence.
For larger values of α, indirect control has a larger effect,
which leads to a hierarchical network where companies
with small numbers of owned firms kout may nevertheless
inherit large control values vi. The case with α = 0.5 and
β = 10 shown in Figs. 3 and 4 exhibits a mixture of these
two scenarios. The transition to a centralized core also
occurs when increasing β and keeping α constant (see
right panel in Fig. 5).
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FIG. 7. Left: Graph layout of a 10× 10 lattice with α = 0.9.
The vertex sizes and colors correspond to the vi values, and
the edge thickness to the wij values. Right: Distribution of
inherited control vi− (1−α) for static poisson graphs having
〈k〉 = 2 and N = 30 000, with different values of α (for α = 0.5
and α = 0.8 shifted). The dashed line is a power law with
exponent −1.
One interesting aspect of the centralization of control
as we have formulated is that it is not entirely dependent
on the adaptive dynamics, and occurs also to some ex-
tent on graphs which are static. Simply solving Eqs. 1
and 2 will lead to a non-trivial distribution of control
values vi which depend on the (in this case fixed) net-
work topology and the control inheritance parameter α.
In Fig. 7 is shown on the left the control values obtained
for a square 2D lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions, and bidirectional edges. What is observed is a
spontaneous symmetry breaking, where despite the topo-
logical equivalence shared between all nodes, a hierarchy
of control is formed, which is not unique and will vary
between each realization of the dynamics. A similar be-
havior is also observed for fully random graphs, as shown
on the right of Fig. 7, where the distribution of control
values becomes increasingly broader for larger values of
α, asymptotically approaching a power-law ρ(v) ∼ v−1
for α→ 1. This behavior is similar to a phase transition
at α = 1, where at this point Eq. 1 no longer converges
to a solution.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have tested the hypothesis that a rich-get-richer
process using a simple, adaptive dynamics is capable of
explaining the phenomenon of concentration of control
observed in the empirical network of company owner-
ship [9]. The process we proposed incorporates the in-
direct control that companies have on other companies
they own, which increases their buying power in a feed-
back fashion, and allows them to gain even more control.
In our model, the system spontaneously organizes into a
steady-state comprised of a well-defined core-periphery
structure, which reproduces many qualitative observa-
tions in the real data presented in [9], such as the rela-
tive portion of control exerted by the dominating com-
panies. Our model shows that this kind of centralized
5structure can emerge without it being an explicit goal of
the companies involved. Instead, it can emerge simply
as a result of individual decisions based on local knowl-
edge only, with the effect that powerful companies can
increase their relative advantage even further.
It is interesting to compare our model to other agent
based models featuring agents competing for centrality.
The emergence of hierarchical, centralized states with in-
teresting patterns of global order was reported for agents
creating links according to game theory [20–22] as well
as for very simple effective rules of rewiring according to
measured centrality [23, 24]. The latter is combined with
phase transitions according to the noise in the rewiring
process. The stylized model of a society studied in [24]
shows a hierarchical structure, if the individuals have a
preference for social status. The intuitive emergence of
hierarchy is associated with shrinking mobility of single
agents within the hierarchy. This effect is present in our
model as well and deserves further investigation.
Our results may shed light on certain antitrust regu-
lation strategies. As we found that a simple mechanism
without collusion suffices for control centralization, any
regulation which is targeted to diminish such activities
may prove fruitless. Instead, targeting the self-organizing
features which lead to such concentration, such as e.g.
limitations on the indirect control of shareholders repre-
senting other companies, may appear more promising.
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